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Abstract
Let X be a convex subset of a locally convex topological vector space, let U ⇢ X
be open with U compact, let F : U ! X be an upper semicontinuous convex
valued correspondence with no fixed points in U \U , let P be a compact absolute
neighborhood retract, and let ⇢ : U ! P be a continuous function. We show
that if the fixed point index of F is not zero, then there is a neighborhood V
of F in the (suitably topologized) space of upper semicontinuous convex valued
correspondences from U to X such that for any continuous function g : P ! V
there is a p 2 P and a fixed point x of g(p) such that ⇢(x) = p. This implies
that no normal form game satisfies the conditions specified in Section 4.6 of Levy
(2013).
Running Title: Parameterized Perturbations
Keywords: Fixed points, essential sets, fixed point index, homotopy, degree theory,
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1 Introduction
The e↵ect of perturbing a parameter—comparative statics—is, of course, a familiar and
important issue in economic analysis. Perfection of a single Nash equilibrium (Selten
(1975)) is defined by requiring that at least some perturbations in a given class give rise
to perturbed games that have nearby equilibria. Roughly, Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)
define strategic stability of a set of equilibria by requiring that for all su ciently small
⇤Email: a.mclennan@economics.uq.edu.au. This work was influenced by numerous conversations
with Yehuda Levy. The presentation has greatly benefitted from Atsushi Kajii’s expositional advice. I
am grateful for the hospitality of the Kyoto Institute for Economic Research of Kyoto University.
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perturbations, the perturbed games have equilibria near the set. This note presents a
topological result concerning the behavior of such nearby equilibria when there is a func-
tion from a neighborhood of the relevant set of equilibria to the space of perturbations.
The situation of interest arose in Levy (2013), which presented two examples of dis-
counted stochastic games with uncountable state spaces that do not have stationary
equilibria, one with deterministic transitions and one in which the transitions are ab-
solutely continuous with respect to a reference measure. Levy and McLennan (2014)
point out that the analysis of the second example is flawed, and they provide a di↵erent
example of a stochastic discounted game with absolutely continuous transitions, relative
to a reference measure, that does not have a stationary equilibrium. For this example
the underlying phenomenon generating nonexistence is drawn from analysis rather than
topology.
Section 4.6 of Levy (2013) explains that the construction could be successfully exe-
cuted if certain perturbations of a “base” normal form game satisfied certain conditions.
The base game used in the flawed construction, which is due to Kohlberg and Mertens
(1986), has a set S of Nash equilibria that is homeomorphic to a circle, and it is desired
that for each " > 0 there is a map from the set of equilibria to the space of "-perturbations
such that the perturbed game associated with each   2 S does not have any equilibria
near  . It turns out that the perturbations given by Levy do not have this property.
A stochastic game of the desired sort could be constructed if another system of
perturbations of the Kohlberg and Mertens’ example satisfied the desired condition, or if
a di↵erent base game had perturbations with the properties laid out in Levy’s Section 4.6.
The result given here (already stated in the abstract) implies that in fact this situation
cannot be attained. We have yet to find other economic applications of this result, but it
is conceptually intriguing and aesthetically appealing (at least in the eyes of the author)
so perhaps it will eventually have other interesting consequences.
The remainder has the following organization. The next section reviews relevant
material from the theory of fixed points. Section 3 states the main result, and Section 4
explains its consequences for Levy (2013). The proof is given in Section 5.
2 Fixed Point Theory
This section gives a highly condensed account of relevant aspects of the topological theory
of fixed points. If X and Y are sets and F : X ! Y is a set valued function, let Gr(F ) =
{ (x, y) 2 X ⇥ Y : y 2 F (x) } be the graph of F , and let F(F ) = { x 2 X : x 2 F (x) }
be its set of fixed points.
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Let X be a topological space. The space X has the fixed point property if F(f) 6= ;
whenever f : X ! X is a continuous function. It is contractible if there is a continuous
function c : X ⇥ [0, 1] ! X with c(x, 0) = x and c(x, 1) = c(x0, 1) for all x, x0 2 X.
Whether every nonempty compact contractible metric space has the fixed point property
was an open question for several years, but Kinoshita (1953) (cf. Section 7.1 of McLennan
(2012)) constructed an example of a compact contractible X ⇢ R3 and a continuous
f : X ! X without any fixed points. Thus the theory of fixed points requires some
additional hypothesis on the spaces it considers.
If A ⇢ X and r : X ! A is continuous with r(a) = a for all a 2 A, then r is said
to be a retraction. If such an r exists, then A is a retract of X. A key intuition is
that a neighborhood U ⇢ A of a point a may, in certain senses, inherit the topological
simplicity of r 1(U). The space X is an absolute neighborhood retract (ANR) (for metric
spaces) if it is metrizable and, whenever e : X ! Y is an embedding of X in a metric
space Y and e(X) is closed, e(X) is a retract of some neighborhood of itself. The class of
ANR’s includes closed convex subsets of locally convex topological vector spaces as well
as simplicial complexes and smooth manifolds (McLennan (2012) Ch. 7). The Hawaiian
earring
S1
n=1{ (x, y) 2 R2 : k(x   1n , y)k = 1n } is an example of a space that is not an
ANR. The fixed point theorem of Eilenberg and Montgomery (1946) implies that every
nonempty compact contractible ANR has the fixed point property.
For a finite dimensional motivation of the fixed point index, consider a smooth man-
ifold M . Let U ⇢M be open with U compact. If f : U ! M is a smooth function such
that F(f) ⇢ U and IdTpM  Df(p) : TpM ! TpM is nonsingular1 for all p 2 F(f), then
the index of f is the number of p 2 F(f) such that the determinant of IdTpM  Df(p) is
positive minus the number of p 2 F(p) such that this determinant is negative.
The theory of the fixed point index extends this notion to a very high level of gen-
erality, by taking its main properties as axioms. An index admissible correspondence is
an upper semicontinuous contractible valued correspondence F : U ! X where X is an
ANR, U ⇢ X is open, U is compact, and F(F ) ⇢ U . (That is, F(F )\ (U \U) = ;.) The
fixed point index is an assignment of an integer ⇤(F ) to each such F with the following
properties:
(Normalization) If X is nonempty and compact and c : X ! X is a constant function,
then ⇤(c) = 1.
(Additivity) If F : U ! X is index admissible, U1, . . . , Ur are disjoint open subsets of U ,
and F has no fixed points in U \ (U1 [ . . . [ Ur), then ⇤(F ) =Pri=1 ⇤(F |Ui).
1Here TpM is the tangent space of M at p.
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(Continuity) If F : U ! X is index admissible, then Gr(F ) has a neighborhood W ⇢
U⇥X such that ⇤(F 0) = ⇤(F ) for all index admissible F 0 : U ! X with Gr(F 0) ⇢W .
(Multiplication) If X and Y are ANR’s, U ⇢ X and V ⇢ Y are open, U and V are
compact, F : U ! X and G : V ! Y are index admissible correspondences, and
F ⇥ G : U ⇥ V ! X ⇥ Y is the correspondence that takes (x, y) to F (x) ⇥ G(y),
then ⇤(F ⇥G) = ⇤(F ) · ⇤(G).
(Commutativity) If X and X 0 are ANR’s, V ⇢ U ⇢ X and V 0 ⇢ U 0 ⇢ X 0 with U ,
V , U 0, and V 0 open, U and U
0
are compact, f : U ! X 0 and f 0 : U 0 ! X are
continuous functions with f(V ) ⇢ U 0 and f 0(V 0) ⇢ U , f  f 0|V 0 and f 0  f |V are index
admissible, and f maps the fixed points of f 0   f |V onto the fixed points of f   f 0|V 0
then ⇤(f 0   f |V ) = ⇤(f   f 0|V 0).
The fixed point index resulted from the evolution of the theory of fixed points during
the first half of the twentieth century; it is commonly attributed to Leray and Schauder.
The axiomatic characterization is due to O’Neill (1953). McLennan (2008) is a brief
but somewhat more informative introduction. Brown (1971) and McLennan (2012) are
comprehensive treatments of existence and uniqueness of the index; the first of these is
from the point of view of pure mathematics, while the second emphasizes issues (such as
correspondences) of importance to economics. Dugundji and Granas (2003) is another
comprehensive reference.
We now make several remarks concerning the fixed point index.
Suppose that F : U ! X is index admissible. If F has no fixed points, then Additivity
gives ⇤(F |;) = ⇤(F ) = ⇤(F |;) + ⇤(F |;) and thus ⇤(F ) = 0. Conversely, if ⇤(F ) 6= 0,
then F(F ) 6= ;.
Suppose that K ⇢ F(F ) is compact and has a neighborhood that contains no other
fixed points of F . The index of K (for F ) is ⇤(F |V ) where V is an open set with
V \F(F ) = V \F(F ) = K; Additivity implies that this number does not depend on the
choice of V . When F(F ) has finitely many connected components, viewing the index as
an assignment of an integer to each component is intuitively appealing.
The set K is essential (for F ) (Fort (1950), Kinoshita (1952), O’Neill (1953)) if for
any neighborhood Z of K there is a neighborhood W ⇢ U ⇥X of Gr(F ) such that each
index admissible F 0 : U ! X with Gr(F 0) ⇢ W has a fixed point in Z. Otherwise K
is inessential. Any neighborhood of Gr(F 0) contains the graph of a continuous function
(Kakutani (1941), Mas-Colell (1974), McLennan (1989), cf. Ch. 9 of McLennan (2012));
we will refer to this result as the approximation theorem. It implies that K is essential
or not according to whether all continuous functions near F have fixed points near K.
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If K is inessential, then its index is zero2 by Continuity, because the index of nearby
perturbations is zero.
Suppose that X is a compact ANR, U ⇢ X is open, and U is compact. Let U be
the set of upper semicontinuous contractible valued correspondences F : U ! X. We
endow U with the topology that has a base consisting of the sets of the form {F 2 U :
Gr(F ) ⇢ W } where W ⇢ U ⇥ X is open; Continuity asserts precisely that the index
is continuous with respect to this topology. If Y is a regular3 topological space and
H : U ⇥Y ! X is a correspondence whose values are compact and contractible, then H
is upper semicontinuous if and only if y 7! H(·, y) is a continuous function from Y to U
(Theorem 5.4.3 of McLennan (2012)). We refer to this as the homotopy principle because
the most important case is Y = [0, 1]. In this way we see that the index is invariant under
homotopy: more generally, if each H(·, y) is index admissible, then Continuity implies
that ⇤(H(·, y)) is a locally constant function of y, hence constant on each connected
component of Y .
Let C ⇢ Rm be nonempty, compact, and convex. If F : C ! C is upper semi-
continuous and convex valued, then Continuity and the approximation theorem imply
that ⇤(F ) = ⇤(f) for some continuous function f : C ! C. Since f is homotopic to
a constant function, the homotopy principle, Continuity, and Normalization imply that
⇤(f) = 1. Since ⇤(F ) 6= 0 implies F(F ) 6= ;, we see that the theory of the fixed point
index subsumes the Kakutani fixed point theorem. If F(F ) is the union of finitely many
connected components, then each of these has a neighborhood containing no other fixed
points, so its index is well defined, and of course Additivity implies that the sum of these
indices is one.
3 The Result
Let X be a convex subset of a locally convex topological vector space. Automatically X
is an ANR (e.g., Proposition 7.4.1 of McLennan (2012)). Let U ⇢ X be open with U
compact, and let U be the set of upper semicontinuous convex valued correspondences
F : U ! X, endowed with the topology described above. (More precisely, it has the
relative topology it inherits as a subspace.) Let P be a compact ANR, thought of as a
space of parameters. The main result is:
Theorem 1. If F 2 U is index admissible, ⇤(F ) 6= 0, and ⇢ : U ! P is a continuous
2The converse—that K is inessential if its index is zero—holds for connected K when X is convex
and finite dimensional and F is convex valued (Theorem 14.5.3 of McLennan (2012)).
3A topological space is regular if every neighborhood of a point contains a closed neighborhood.
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function, then there is a neighborhood V ⇢ U of F such that for any continuous g : P !
V there is a p 2 P such that ⇢ 1(p) \ F(g(p)) 6= ;.
Remark: Since a perturbation g : P ! V parameterized by P induces a perturbation
g  ⇢ parameterized by U , it might seem that the result could be simplified by identifying
P with U , but this is not without loss of generality because U need not be an ANR. On
the other hand the proof does depend on the fact that P ⇥X is an ANR (Propositions
7.4.1 and 7.4.3 of McLennan (2012)). As with the the fixed point property for compact
contractible sets, it is not easy to give an example showing that the hypothesis that P
is an ANR is indispensible, but the proof applies fixed point theory to P ⇥ X, so this
seems quite likely.
4 Application
Section 4.6 of Levy (2013) specifies conditions on a “base” game that are su cient for
the method of that paper to yield an example of a stochastic game with absolutely
continuous transitions that has no stationary equilibrium. In this section we explain
why no game satisfies those conditions. Let G be a finite strategic form game, and let
NE be its set of Nash equilibria.
Corollary 1. If P ⇢ NE is an absolute neighborhood retract, U is a neighborhood of
NE in the space of mixed strategy profiles, and ⇢ : U ! P is a retraction, then there is
a neighborhood W of G in the space of games (for the given strategic form) such that
for any continuous h : P ! W there is some e 2 P such that ⇢ 1(e) contains a Nash
equilibrium of h(e).
Proof. To obtain this from Theorem 1, let X be the set of mixed strategy profiles of
G, let F be its best reply correspondence, and for e 2 P , let g(e) be the best response
correspondence of h(e). (The map taking each game to its best response correspondence
is easily shown to be continuous when the space of correspondences has the topology
described in the last section.)
For a positive integer n let Cn = { x 2 Rn+1 : kxk = 1 } be the boundary of the
hypercube [ 1, 1]n+1. By a facet of Cn we will mean a subset of the forms { x 2 Cn :
xi = 1 } and { x 2 Cn : xi =  1 }. The following conditions are slightly weaker than
those specified by Levy (2013):
(1) NE contains a unique hyperstable set H .
(2) H is connected but not nullhomotopic.
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(3) For some positive integer n there exist:
(a) a continuous embedding  : Cn ! H that is not nullhomotopic in H ;
(b) a retraction ⇢˜ : NE!  (Cn);
(c) for all " > 0, a continuous function  " from Cn to the "-neighborhood of G (in
the space of games with the same pure strategy sets) such that for each facet
E of [ 1, 1]n+1, any equilibrium of any game in  "(E) is in the "-neighborhood
of ⇢˜ 1( ( E)).
The precise definition of hyperstability (Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)) will not be re-
quired. It involves a robustness condition on compact subsets of NE that we will refer to
as quasihyperstability. (Kohlberg and Mertens do not use this term.) A compact subset
of NE is necessarily quasihyperstable if a subset is quasihyperstable. A compact subset
of NE is hyperstable if it is a minimal (with respect to set inclusion) quasihyperstable
set. Kohlberg and Mertens show that any quasihyperstable set contains a hyperstable
set. Govindan and Wilson (2005) show that a connected component of NE is essential if
and only if it satisfies a condition called uniform hyperstability that is slightly stronger
than quasihyperstability.
We note that (1), (2), and (a) and (b) of (3) are satisfied by the base game used by
Levy (2013) (which is taken from Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)) because its set of Nash
equilibria is homeomorphic to C1, and was shown by Kohlberg and Mertens to be the
unique hyperstable set. Assuming that (1), (2), and (3) (including (c)) hold, we will
show that Corollary 1 is violated.
As a semi-algebraic set, NE is triangulable (e.g., Bochnak et al. (1987)) and thus
the union of finitely many connected components. One of these contains H . Each other
connected component does not contain a hyperstable set, hence is not quasihyperstable,
hence is not uniformly hyperstable, hence is inessential, and consequently its index is
zero. As we saw above, the index of NE is one, and Additivity implies that the index of
the component containing H is also one.
Since NE is triangulable, and a simplicial complex is an ANR (e.g., Propositions
7.3.2 and 7.4.1 of McLennan (2012)) there is a retraction of a neighborhood U of NE
onto NE. The composition of this with ⇢˜ gives an extension ⇢ of ⇢˜ to U . Since  is
an embedding, for each facet E of Cn, ⇢˜ 1( (E)) and ⇢˜ 1( ( E)) are disjoint compact
sets, so for su ciently small   the distance between these two sets is at least 2 . By
replacing U with a smaller neighborhood of NE we can insure that for each E, ⇢ 1( (E))
is contained in the  -ball surrounding ⇢˜ 1( (E)).
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Now suppose that for each " > 0 there is a continuous function  " from Cn to the "-
neighborhood of G, as per (c) of (3). The upper semicontinuity of the Nash equilibrium
correspondence implies that for su ciently small " > 0, U contains the set of Nash
equilibria of  "(c) for any c 2 Cn. If " <  , c is an element of the facet E, and (as per
(c)) the set of Nash equilibria of  "(c) is contained in the "-neighborhood of ⇢˜ 1( ( E)),
then there are no equilibria in ⇢ 1( (c)). But Corollary 1 implies that this cannot be
the case for all c 2 Cn.
Evidently this contradiction could be obtained from hypotheses that are weaker than
(1)-(3) in several ways. In particular, the assumption thatH and  are not nullhomotopic
plays no role, and the retraction ⇢˜ need only be defined on the connected component of
NE containing H .
5 Proof
In preparation for the proof, we have the following topological fact.
Lemma 1. If X is a compact regular space, Y is a convex subset of a locally convex
topological vector space, and F : X ! Y is an upper semicontinuous compact convex
valued correspondence, then any neighborhoodW of Gr(F ) contains an open neighborhood
W 0 such that { y : (x, y) 2W 0 } is convex for each x 2 X.
Proof. For each x 2 X and y 2 F (x) the definition of the product topology, continuity
of addition in the TVS containing Y , and regularity, give a closed neighborhood Dy of x
and an open neighborhood Vy of the origin such that Dy⇥(Y \(y+Vy+Vy)) ⇢W . Since
F (x) is compact, it is contained in
Sk
i=1 yi+Vyi for some y1, . . . , yk. Setting Cx =
T
iDyi
and Ux = (F (x) +
T
i Vyi) \ Y gives a closed neighborhood of x and a convex open
neighborhood of F (x) such that Cx ⇥ Ux ⇢ W . Regularity and the definition of upper
semicontinuity imply that we may achieve Gr(F )\ (Cx⇥X) ⇢ Cx⇥Ux by replacing Cx
with a smaller closed neighborhood of x. Now choose x1, . . . , x` such that
S
j Cxj = X,
and let
W 0 =
[
x2X
⇣
{x}⇥
\
x2Cxj
Uxj
⌘
.
Evidently W 0 contains Gr(F ) by construction and is open because each x 2 X has a
neighborhood whose points x0 all satisfy { j : x0 2 Cxj } ⇢ { j : x 2 Cxj }.
Proof of Theorem 1. For an open set W ⇢ U ⇥X containing Gr(F ), let V be the set of
F 0 2 U such that Gr(F 0) ⇢W . We can replace W with W \{ (x, x) : x 2 U \U }, so that
each element of V has no fixed points outside of U and is consequently index admissible.
Continuity allows us to chooseW so that ⇤(F 0) = ⇤(F ) 6= 0 for all F 0 2 V . By the result
above we may assume that { y : (x, y) 2 W } is convex for each x. The approximation
theorem implies that there is a continuous function f : U ! X with Gr(f) ⇢W .
Let g : P ! V be continuous. The homotopy principle implies that we may regard g
as an upper semicontinuous convex valued correspondence from P ⇥U to X whose graph
is contained in P⇥W . Our objective is to show that there is a (p, x) with x 2 g(p, x) and
⇢(x) = p. By the approximation theorem, any neighborhood of the graph of g contains
the graph of a continuous function, and if there was no such (p, x), then this would also
be the case if g was replaced by a su ciently nearby function. Therefore we may assume
that g : P ⇥ U ! X is a continuous function.
Setting U 0 = P ⇥ U , let ' : U ! P ⇥X and '0 : U 0 ! X be the functions
'(x) = (⇢(x), f(x)) and '0(p, x) = x.
Let Z = U\f 1(U) and Z 0 = P⇥Z. We have f(Z) ⇢ U , '(Z) ⇢ U 0, and '0(Z 0) ⇢ U , so
'0 '|Z = f |Z , and ' '0|Z0 is the map (p, x) 7! (⇢(x), f(x)). Therefore F('0 '|Z) = F(f)
because F(f) ⇢ Z, and F(' '0|Z0) = { (⇢(x), x) : x 2 F(f) }. In particular, '0 '|Z and
' '0|Z0 are index admissable, and 'maps F('0 '|Z) onto F(' '0|Z0), so Commutativity
and Additivity give ⇤('   '0|Z0) = ⇤('0   '|Z) = ⇤(f |Z) = ⇤(f) 6= 0.
Let h : P ⇥U ⇥ [0, 1]! X be the homotopy h(p, x, t) = (1  t)f(x) + tg(p, x). Since
f(x), g(p, x) 2 { y : (x, y) 2 W } for all p and x, the graph of each ht is contained in
P ⇥W . (We follow the standard notational convention, writing ht in place of h(·, ·, t).)
Let ⌘ : Z
0 ⇥ [0, 1] ! P ⇥ X be the homotopy ⌘(p, x, t) = (⇢(x), h(p, x, t)); note that
⌘0 = ' '0|Z0 and ⌘1(p, x) = (⇢(x), g(p, x)). For each t, if (p, x) is a fixed point of ⌘t, then
x is a fixed point of ht(p, ·) and consequently an element of U . Therefore the fixed points
of each ⌘t are contained in P ⇥U , so ⌘t is index admissible. Now the homotopy principle
and Continuity imply that ⇤(⌘1) = ⇤(⌘0) 6= 0, and consequently ⌘1 has a nonempty set
of fixed points. That is, for some p and x, x 2 ⇢ 1(p) \ F(g(p)).
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